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I24In many countries, important thresholds in examinations act as a gateway to higher levels of education and/or
improved employment prospects. This paper examines the consequences of just failing a particularly important
high stakes national examination taken at the end of compulsory schooling in England. It uses unique adminis-
trative data, including full information on both initial and regraded exam marks, to show that students of the
same ability have significantly different educational trajectories depending on whether they just pass or fail
this exam. Three years later, students who just fail to achieve the required threshold have a lower probability
of entering an upper-secondary high-level academic or vocational track and of starting tertiary education.
Those who fail to pass the threshold are also more likely to drop out of education by age 18, without some
form of employment. The moderately high effects of just passing or failing to pass the threshold in this high-
stakes exam has high potential long-term consequences for those affected.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1 GCSEs grades are awarded on a scale of A*-G where fails are given the letter U. Marks1. Introduction
The long-term economic and social impacts of passing or failing
exams have long been of interest. Narrowly passing or failing exams
and the effect on individuals with highly similar abilities and observable
characteristics has recently been a prominent focus for research. This
has come about, at least in part, because the availability of rich adminis-
trative data from different settings permits study of scoring just above
or just below a particular threshold. Examples include different degree
classifications, acquiring a high school diploma or reaching a certain
grade point average, to name just a few.
Why is honing in on near passes and failures important? One reason
is that, in many contexts, achievement of particular exam thresholds,
especially those leading to key qualifications, is seen as vital by educa-
tors, employers and governments. This makes just passing the thresh-
old a substantively interesting outcome to consider. Moreover, in
decentralised education systemswheremechanisms like pay for perfor-
mance operate and where school rankings are important, exam thresh-
olds can play a role in incentivising teachers and school managers. In
such contexts, the ‘pass/fail’ threshold may have longer-term conse-
quences for students with approximately the same marks and level ofsity of Surrey, United Kingdom.
cnally1@lse.ac.uk (S. McNally),
.V. This is an open access article undeffort. As shown by Costrell (1994), under quite general conditions,
even if educational standards are chosen optimally, it may be welfare
enhancing to improve information flows (i.e. on the underlying
marks) such that achievement of a binary threshold (the standard) be-
comes less important. In some contexts (such as the one considered
here) it is also important to consider the counterfactual for students
who do not pass the threshold because individuals are still very young
and expected to proceed to upper secondary education.
This paper offers an empirical study of the consequences of just pass-
ing or failing a particularly important national high stakes exam using a
(fuzzy) regression discontinuity design. The context is the national ex-
aminations taken by all students at the end of compulsory schooling
in England. More specifically, evidence is presented on the importance
of just obtaining a grade C in English – a good pass – in high stakes na-
tional examinations taken for the General Certificate of Secondary Edu-
cation (or GCSEs) when students are 16 years of age.1 Arguably, this is
much more important than obtaining certain grade scores in other
countries. Although external examinations at the end of compulsoryare the overall points received in the subject. For GCSE English and the cohort under study,
marks can take values from 0 to 300. More details can be found in Section 2. We focus on
English rather than maths because we have detailed data on English marks for an exam
board that accounts for over half of exams in English (discussed later in the paper and in
Appendix A).
er the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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places an unusually high weight on the GCSE exam, not least because
GCSE indicators appear in published school performance tables. In En-
gland, the grade C threshold at the end of lower secondary education
can affect access to the quality of upper secondary education available
to the student (via the programme or institution) and therefore
whether he/she has good preparation for tertiary education. For in-
stance, a grade C is typically necessary to access some qualifications,
though not all, at the upper secondary education level. Alongside its
use by educators, a grade C in English and/or maths is also important
for employers. Since 2015 this level of achievement has been deemed
so important that it has become mandatory for students to repeat the
school leaving exam if they fail to get a C grade in English or maths
and wish to continue in some form of publicly funded education
thereafter.
Despite the general acknowledgement that obtaining a C grade in
GCSE English and maths matters for future outcomes, there is no causal
evidence to date to substantiate this claim and assess consequences for
those who narrowly miss. The main empirical challenge is to address
potential endogeneity around who passes this threshold. This paper
makes use of a novel linked (administrative) dataset with student
level information on the distribution of exact marks around the impor-
tant threshold of grade C.We use this to estimate the effect of just pass-
ing the grade C threshold on later outcomes using a fuzzy regression
discontinuity design. Specifically, the probability of achieving a grade
C is instrumented with the original mark (i.e. before any appeal has
been made by the school on behalf of the student to consider a re-
grade).
The data and methodological challenges have some similarities to
two recent papers studying the effects of possible teacher manipulation
of exam scores - one studying a national examination in Sweden, the
other a high school exit examination from New York. In the Swedish
paper, Diamond and Persson (2016) report significant test scoremanip-
ulation around known grade thresholds in the national mathematics
tests taken by ninth graders. In the New York study, Dee et al. (2019)
demonstrate that manipulation took place in the New York Regents
exam taken by high school students.2 In both cases, students who
cross the threshold benefit in terms of later educational and/or labour
market outcomes. Diamond and Persson (2016) find that test scorema-
nipulation around a given threshold raises the student's likelihood of
achieving a grade in maths which is necessary for admittance to any
high school and also find that manipulated students perform better in
high school, which in turn translates to higher income at age 23. They
argue that these effects,which are particularly pronounced at the higher
end of the ability distribution, are driven either by increased self-
confidence of students or potentially by signalling to other teachers to
subsequently give higher grades as well. Dee et al. (2019) finds that
having an exam score manipulated to fall above a performance cutoff
has a substantial positive effect on the probability of graduating from
high school, but a negative effect on the probability of meeting the re-
quirements for a more advanced high school diploma. They argue that
students at the margin of dropping out are ‘helped’ by not having to re-
take classes but those on the margin of the advanced diploma are ‘hurt’
by not being pushed to do necessary preparation for more advanced
coursework. Whereas Diamond and Persson (2016) and Dee et al.
(2019) have teacher cheating or bias in mind as the underlying mecha-
nismbehind grade scoremanipulation, this is not the case in the English2 Several other recent papers that involve analysing the consequences of teacher/exam-
iner bias in high-stakes exams for student outcomes (such as Apperson et al., 2016 and
Borcan et al., 2017) examine the effect of teacher bias in marking more generally (e.g.
Angrist et al., 2017; Lavy and Sand, 2018; Terrier, 2016). Battistin and Neri (2017) is an-
other paper concerned with manipulation of test scores in an English context. They use
an anomaly in the marking system with regard to primary schools in England (which
existed prior to 2007) to identify the relationship between (randomly induced) signalling
in test scores and house prices. They show that publicly available information on test
scores yields a significant house price differential.context (as we explain below). Furthermore, while they have to impute
a ‘pre-adjusted’ distribution of marks, we have access both to initial
marks and (where relevant) regraded exam marks. This gives a big
modelling advantage compared to other papers. Like these other papers,
we show that passing the threshold has important consequences for
students – but in our case, not because of any teacher manipulation.
There are other papers that analyse the effect of obtaining an impor-
tant educational signal (as a consequence of luck), but they are for older
students and in different educational contexts. The population of inter-
est in these other papers have already selected into post-compulsory
education, and therefore their results do not apply to all school aged
children, as is the case here. For example, Clark and Martorell (2014)
evaluate the signalling value of a high school diploma in theUS for earn-
ings later in life. Ebenstein et al. (2016) evaluate the effect of shocks (or
bad luck) in the context of high stakes exams in Israel, using transitory
variation that comes from pollution exposure. Canaan and Mouganie
(2018) study the impact of marginally passing the French high school
exit exam on choice of higher education institution and degree subject.
There is also a literature that looks at the impact of passing college ad-
mission exams on subsequent outcomes using regression discontinuity
methods (e.g. Anelli, 2016; Avery et al., 2018; Goodman et al., 2017;
Kaufmann et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2017; Zimmerman, 2014).3
The findings reported in this paper show that failing to achieve a
grade C in English has a large associated cost. Put another way, themar-
ginal student would have performed significantly better in the longer
termhad he/she not been so unlucky at this point. This is not necessarily
a natural consequence of failing to reach an important threshold in a
high stakes exam. For example, Clark and Martorell (2014) find that
marginal students do not benefit from marginally passing high school
exit exams in the US (as reflected in earnings). Furthermore, many of
the outcomes considered here are achieved by the vast majority of stu-
dents of this ability level (i.e. we are not, for example, talking about ra-
tioning of places in elite institutions).
In our context, students who just fail to obtain a grade C in English
are more likely to drop out of education early and become classified as
‘not in education, employment or training’ (or NEET) at age 18. They
are much less likely to have entered a high-level course in upper sec-
ondary education up to 3 years after having sat the GCSE exams, by
the age of 19 (which is the age by which most English students will
have entered upper secondary education if they are going to start at
all). This is in spite of the fact that there are opportunities to enrol in
other courses (and in principle progress to the next level) and at the
same time retake GCSE exams in subsequent academic years.4 We also
find that students are less likely to enter tertiary education by the age
of 19. All these indicators make poor employment and earnings pros-
pects more likely in the longer term.
Evidence on themechanisms throughwhich failing to obtain a grade
C in English leads to poor outcomes is presented. These involve a
narrowing of opportunities that arise within the educational system
on the choice of post-16 institution and course the year after failing to
get a C grade in GCSE English. This does not mean that students are per-
manently excluded from particular institutions or courses. Those who
marginally fail should be able to progress in their education and get
back on track the subsequent year. However, we find that a significant
minority fail to do so asmuch as 3 years after the event. In addition, stu-
dents end up in institutions with a worse academic environment (as
measured by peer quality).
Compared to the previous literature, this paper is the first to offer in-
sights on the negative consequences of marginally failing to reach an3 Other related examples include the effects of class of degree on earnings (e.g. Feng and
Graetz, 2017; Freier et al., 2015); how test score labels affect human capital investment de-
cisions (Papay et al., 2015) and how individuals' choice of educational quality—measured
by college reputation—may likewise signal their ability (MacLeod et al., 2017).
4 However, the pass-rate for those students re-taking the GCSE English exam in our co-
hort is very low. We offer more details in Section 2.
3S. Machin et al. / Journal of Public Economics 190 (2020) 104224institutionally set threshold in national high-stake exams taken by the
overall student population. This paper suggests that themarginal student
who is unlucky pays a high price. This is consistent with descriptive evi-
dence that suggests that the English educational system offers limited
prospects for those who leave compulsory education without good
grades. For example, Hupkau et al. (2017) show that the probability of
progression from lower level to higher level courses is relatively low
and several studies also show non-existent wage returns to lower-level
courses (Dearden et al., 2002; McIntosh, 2006). The more general mes-
sage is that failure to pass a ‘high stakes’ threshold can have very serious
consequences for students at the margin in the absence of well-designed
courses for those who fail. While the existence of such thresholds may be
necessary to incentivise effort by students and institutions, policy makers
and administrators have a choice on what other information to provide
and onwhat resources to invest in the upper secondary education of stu-
dents who do not pass the threshold. In England, students and schools do
find out the exactmarks (aswell as the threshold) but such information is
not systematically provided to Further Education providers (i.e. the insti-
tution towhich studentsmove to for their upper secondary education). As
the new institution does not knowwho themarginal student is, it may be
difficult to offer appropriate support.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we provide some
information on the institutional background of relevant parts of the ed-
ucation system in England, with a special focus on the school-leaving
exams, the empirical distribution of pre-appeal and post-appeal marks,
and a descriptive analysis ofwho gets regraded (Section 2). Thenwe dis-
cuss the research design and discuss its validity (Section 3), before pre-
senting our results (Section 4); and discussing thepotentialmechanisms
and implications (Section 5). We conclude in Section 6.
2. Grades in high stakes examinations
2.1. End of school-leaving examinations
In its compulsory phases, the English education system is organised
into four Key Stages (KS). There are external assessments at the end of
primary school (at Key Stage 2) and at the end of compulsory full-
time education (at Key Stage 4 – the GCSE examinations), when stu-
dents are aged 16 (as grade repetition very rarely occurs). The typical
student takes 8–10 GCSE exams and it is compulsory to sit exams in En-
glish, maths and science. After this time, most students pursue post-
secondary courses for at least two years, which may be at the same
school or in an institution specialising in academic education (e.g.
Sixth Form Colleges) or in vocational education or some combination
of vocational and academic courses (typically Further Education Col-
leges). The cohort considered here was the first under an obligation to
stay in some form of education (which can be part-time) up to the age
of 17. In practice, most students were already doing this, though drop-
out is more common at age 18.
GCSEs are marked on a scale of A*-G where fails are given the letter
U. A ‘good’ grade at GCSE is regarded as being at least a C,with particular
emphasis on achieving this standard in English and maths. Students
who do not get a grade C may re-sit GCSE exams in these subjects in
subsequent academic years. Since 2015 it has been compulsory for stu-
dents who do not achieve a grade C in English or maths to re-sit the
exam, but the cohort considered here was not affected by this reform.
In this cohort, 29.3% of the students failing to get a grade C retook the
exam up to two years later, with 45% managing to secure a grade C or
above (Department for Education, 2016).
GCSE exams are set and marked by different exam boards – of which
there are four in England.5 There is a regulator (theOffice of Qualifications5 There has been a variety of exam boards in the UK since at least the early 1900s, with
some modifications over time as the education system has changed. They have regional
roots but are nationwide.andExaminations Regulation, Ofqual) that is responsible for ensuring that
standards are maintained across boards and over time. A number of as-
sessment units feed into the overall GCSE grade in English. Some of
these are teacher assessed (and moderated by the exam board) and
some are based on a standardised exam that is corrected (anonymously)
by external examiners that performonlinemarking on separate questions
of the exam(not thewhole script). Exams take place after the coursework
assessment (usually at the end of the school year). In the year of relevance
to our study (2013), 40% of the overall marks were accounted for by the
standardised exam. Crucially, for teacher-assessed units, teachers are
not given advance information on how rawmarks on the different assess-
ment units are translated to the ‘unifiedmarking scheme’ (UMS)which is
the format of the finalmarks (and is on a scale of 0–300;where 180 is the
threshold of a C grade). Marks vary from year to year on the various units
that make up a student's overall assessment. Furthermore, grade bound-
aries are not decided in advance of the exam. This is decided by an exter-
nal committee that engages in a process of inspecting papers (e.g.
comparing them to previous years) and statistical analysis (more detail
is given in Appendix A). Thus, it is not possible for teachers tomanipulate
coursework assessments such that the marginal student just crosses the
threshold for a grade C. Moreover, the exam board issues strict grading
guidelines for units that are teacher assessed, and this marking can also
be subject to reviews if inconsistencies are detected.
After the standardised exam, requests for a re-mark of scripts can
only come through the school (i.e. not from the individual student)
and at a price of roughly £40per script. At this point, there is a possibility
that different schools will vary in their propensity to request re-grading
for marginal students. In 2013, there were appeals for about 2% of all
GCSE exams, with about one in six appeals leading to a grade change
(Office of Qualifications and Examinations Regulation, 2013).2.2. English language grades
We use administrative data on the census of school students in state
schools where we have information as they progress through different
stages of education. We use data from students who were in their
final year of compulsory education, undertaking their GCSE exams in
June 2013 (when they were aged 16). We use data on the grades in
their various GCSE exams, their prior attainment (e.g. test scores in
their national Key Stage 2 exams taken at age 11), the school attended,
and some personal characteristics such as gender, eligibility for free
school meals, ethnicity and whether English is spoken as a first lan-
guage. We are able to follow students up to three years later, as they
pursue upper-secondary post-compulsory education (‘Key Stage 5’)
and we observe whether they enrol in any form of tertiary education
by the age of 19. We link the education data to administrative data on
employment and self-employment from the Longitudinal Educational
Outcomes data set (LEO). Appendix A offers a thorough description of
the data sources used, aswell as describing the sample selection criteria
and construction of variables.
We are able tomerge theGCSE exam grade in English to information
on pre-review and post-review marks from one of the four exam
boards, the AQA. This exam board accounts for well over half of all
exam entries in GCSE English (61.6% of GCSE English Language entries,
and 55.7% of GCSE English entries; see Table A1 and Section A1 in Ap-
pendix A for more details on these qualifications).6 To ensure we are
considering only those students taking the same assessment, we focus
on the form of English exam that is undertaken by 72% of students (‘En-
glish Language’) and on those students taking the higher tier exam
within this group (77% of students). However, we observe similar6 Analysis about awarding bodies suggests that schools choose exam boards predomi-
nantly based on theperceived quality of the syllabus onoffer and seldomchange providers
(Frontier Economics, 2015). Media reports suggest that perceptions of difficulty are rele-
vant. https://www.theguardian.com/education/2009/aug/25/teachers-choosing-exam-
boards-gcse.
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might sit as an alternative and if we consider those taking the lower
tier (English language) exam paper.
The characteristics of entrants sitting the GCSE English Language ex-
amination with AQA in June 2013 are shown in Table 1 (column 2). We
compare their characteristics with those for the whole cohort of stu-
dents that sat GCSE English Language in June 2013 (column 1). Even
though they perform slightly better (students in our sample are about
2 percentage points more likely to achieve a C grade or above), they
are very similar in terms of predetermined characteristics to all students
in the cohort. In columns (3) and (4), we focus on the students that are
of main interest for this paper: those in the C-D range. For the reasons
outlined above, we divide students in the C-D range into those that sat
the Higher Tier paper (column 3) and those that sat the Foundation
exam paper (column 4). As is expected, higher tier students are much
better performing than lower tier students: whereas 85% of higher tier
students achieve a C grade, only 57.5% do so in the Foundation tier. In
terms of predetermined characteristics, higher tier students in the C-D
range aremore similar to the average student in the cohort. The remain-
ing analysis refers to the higher tier students.
The data used are unique in that both the ‘pre-manipulation’ and
‘post-manipulation’ distributions of marks are available for the same
students (i.e. before and after re-marking is requested). We also know
who has applied for a re-mark and the outcome of this process. Hence,
we can use the data to directly calculate and infer why the distributions
differ. Importantly, this has not been possible in other papers looking at
related questions where estimation of the counter-factual distribution
has been necessary (Dee et al., 2019; Diamond and Persson, 2016).
Fig. 1 shows the final distribution of marks after re-marking has
taken place. Specifically, the marks combine the various units of assess-
ment to the ‘unified marking scheme’ (which is on a scale of 0–300;
where 180 is the threshold of a C grade). There is clear bunching at
the threshold for grade C. In fact, this aspect of the distribution has
strong similarities to the exam mark distributions in other countries
where manipulation has been identified close to important thresholds
(Dee et al., 2019; Diamond and Persson, 2016). In the English context,
however, this is not a consequence of teacher bias in marking because
teachers do not know how their coursework assessments will contrib-
ute to the final mark, nor where the grade boundary will be set. It is
also not possible for examiners to manipulate total marks because
they correct specific questions rather than whole scripts. However, it
may arise from many re-grading requests for students near the bound-
ary. Furthermore, requests for remarking may be non-random with re-
spect to student or school characteristics (which we examine below).
Fig. 2a shows the original distribution of marks (i.e. before any review
takes place) overlaying the final distribution. This shows that the origi-
nal distribution ofmarks is approximately normal (note that there is not
a one-to-one mapping between the raw scores and the scaled scores,
leading to some lack of smoothness). Fig. 2b zooms in to the area of in-
terest. We test for the presence of manipulation around the C cut-off in
both distributions using the test proposed by Frandsen (2017) in the
context of regression discontinuity designs with a discrete running var-
iable, since marks only change in increments of 1 point from 0 to 300.7
As expected, the results of the test under k=0 lead us to reject the null
of absence of manipulation in the post-appeal distribution (p-value =
0.000); whereaswe cannot reject the null (p-value= 0.489) of absence
of manipulation in the original (i.e. pre-appeal) distribution of marks.7 We implement the test using the Stata command rddisttestk. See Frandsen (2017) for
more details. We choose the parameter k (that determines themaximal degree of nonlin-
earity in the probabilitymass function that is still considered to be compatiblewith noma-
nipulation) to be able to detectmanipulation in themost stringent situation (when k=0).
As Frandsen (2017) points out, a large kmeans that themass at the threshold can deviate
substantially from linearity before the testwill rejectwith high probability, while a small k
means even small deviations from linearity will lead the test to reject with high probabil-
ity. Choosing k to be conservatively high will therefore reduce the test's power to detect
manipulation.2.3. Regrading
As mentioned above and described in Appendix A, we also know
the students for whom the school has applied for any kind of review
and the outcome of this process. We can use these data to directly
calculate and infer why the distributions differ. Reviews can be re-
quested for controlled assessments in unit 3 (teacher assessed unit
evaluating ‘extended reading and creative writing’, accounting for a
40% of the overall mark) and for the external exam (unit 1, account-
ing for another 40% of the mark).8 Most reviews correspond to
remarking requests of the latter (i.e. 70% of review requests in the
AQA language sample of higher tier students are due to requests to
remark unit 1 – increasing to 74% in the D-C range).
Fig. 3 shows the probability of requesting any kind of review
within each original mark. The probability is generally very small
but rises close to cut-offs to grade thresholds. This is much more
prominent for grade C than for any other grade threshold. For those
very close to the grade C threshold (180 marks), the probability of
requesting a review is over 60%. In contrast, the probability only
rises to about 20% near the thresholds for grades B (210 marks), A
(240 marks) and A* (270 marks). This is illustrative of the perceived
importance attached to getting a grade C within the English educa-
tion system. The figure also shows the probability of actually being
upgraded. This shows that a high proportion of students for whom
a re-mark is requested do not actually cross the relevant threshold,
and that crossing it is only likely for those students that originally
scored a mark very close to the threshold.
We examine the probability of requesting a review and the condi-
tional probability of being upgraded in Table 2. We use only those
students whose original marks were in the range of a C-D grade
and we always control for the student's original mark. We regress
whether or not a review is made (and an upgrade received) against
available student demographics and their achievement in national
tests at primary school. Specifically, the variables are whether the
student is white; eligible to receive free school meals; speaks English
as a first language; female; and the standardised test score in na-
tional tests (a composite of English, maths and science) at age 11.
The results are similar whether these variables are included sepa-
rately or together. Column (1) shows results for the Linear Probabil-
ity Model where the dependent variable is whether any kind of
review is requested for a student. In column (2), we re-estimate
the regression including school fixed effects. In column (3), the de-
pendent variable is whether the student is upgraded from D to C
(conditional on a request having been made) and the regression
controls for school fixed effects. Results in all specifications are
very similar when we control for the original marks with a quadratic
functional form and when we additionally let the slope of the
student's original marks to vary on each side of the original C thresh-
old (see Table B1 in the online Appendix). They are also very similar
when restricting the sample to those originally scoring very close to
the threshold, but under the C threshold (5 points below), and with-
out controlling for the original marks.
The average probability of requesting a review in the C&D range is
about 10%. Reviewing of scripts is less likely to be requested for fe-
males (by close to 1 percentage point) and more likely to be re-
quested for those with higher scores in primary school. Otherwise,
there is no relationship between demographic characteristics and
the probability of a review being requested. When school fixed ef-
fects are included (column 2), the coefficients decline for both gen-
der and prior attainment (though for the latter it is still precisely
estimated and statistically significant). This is likely to reflect the
fact that requests for re-marking come via the school and not the8 Unit 2 (‘Speaking and Listening’, accounting for a 20% of themark for the cohort com-
pleting GCSEs in the academic year 2013) cannot be subject to any reviews. See Appendix
A (Section A2) for more details.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
(1) (2) (3) (4)




AQA English Language C&D sample
- Higher Tier
AQA English Language C&D sample
- Foundation Tier
Achieved C or above (Level 2) in GCSE Englisha (%) 81.9 83.8 85.2 57.5
Predetermined characteristics and prior Key Stage 2 performance
White ethnicity (%) 81.2 79.9 81.1 78.3
Eligible for free school meal (%) 11.1 10.3 10.3 16.7
English spoken at home (%) 88.9 88.2 89.0 86.3
Female (%) 52.9 53.7 48.7 43.6
KS2 total points 70.3 71.1 68.1 60.0
Number of pupils 383,730 189,485 49,231 33,034
Note.
a This is calculated from the variable ks4_lev2eng in the KS4 Candidate Indicator dataset (more details on the datasets used are given in Appendix A). This indicator includes all qual-
ifications counting towards GCSE English in school performance tables (this includes both GCSE English and GCSE English Language). 2013 cohort: those in the KS4 Candidate/Indicator
tables that belong to year group 11 (derived frombirthdate) and appear in the Censusdata (i.e.wehavedata on pre-determined characteristics). Students sitting English LanguageGCSE in
the 2013 cohort are those students that are observed in the 2013 KS4Results tables as having sat a full GCSEqualification in English Languagewith any of the awarding bodies.More details
about the sample and variable construction are given in Appendix A.
5S. Machin et al. / Journal of Public Economics 190 (2020) 104224individual. The probability of being upgraded to a C grade (which
happens for 12% of students for whom a review is requested in
our sample) is not related to any demographic characteristic of
students, and only marginally to prior attainment. This is not
surprising given that examiners doing the re-marking of the exter-
nally examined unit know nothing about the students or the school
they attend.
3. Research design and descriptive analysis
3.1. Research design
The institutional setting has imposed an important threshold at
grade C from which similar students will fall either side simply be-
cause they perform relatively well or badly on the day of assessment.
We are interested in establishing the causal effect of getting a C
grade (at the end of compulsory education) at age 16 on later out-
comes for students who otherwise look the same based on observ-
able characteristics. In other words, what is the effect of getting a C
grade in English language GCSE when this is simply a matter of
good luck? However, because who enters the appeals process is
not a random draw (i.e. schools make a decision to apply for a re-Fig. 1. Final (post-review) distribution ofmarks. Note. Histogram showing the final (post-
appeal) distribution of marks for Higher Tier students (i.e. those sitting the Higher Tier
paper in Unit 1). See Appendix A for further details on the data sample construction.mark in the case of certain students), who ultimately gets a C
grade is potentially endogenous. Hence, we need a strategy to over-
come this problem.
To assess the effect of obtaining a C grade on later outcomes, we
make use of the fact that we have the original (pre-review)mark dis-
tribution and can use this to build an instrument to predict whether a
person actually obtains grade C by the end of their compulsory edu-
cation (Key Stage 4). Fig. 4 illustrates the first stage and shows that
the original mark is a very strong predictor of whether grade C is fi-
nally obtained (after the review process). It is not a perfect predictor
because of the possibility of re-grading. The probability is 1 beyond
the critical threshold for two reasons. First, the pattern just to the
right of the C cut-off arises because there is no incentive for schools
to enter students for a re-mark if they are just above the threshold,
since this is costly and there is a possibility of being downgraded.
This is reflected in the pattern of applications throughout the distri-
bution in Fig. 3. Second, this sample only contains students who
eventually obtain a grade C or grade D in their English language
exam (i.e. it does not contain those who get upgraded from grade C
to B).
For students on the left of the C cut-off, the incentive to apply
for a re-mark becomes much stronger, the closer the student's
original mark is to the C threshold. Thus, to the left of the cut-off,
the probability of obtaining a C grade gradually increases from
about 10 marks away from the C threshold, whereas to the right
of the cut-off, the probability of getting a C grade is 1 (i.e. a par-
tially fuzzy regression discontinuity design (Battistin and Rettore,
2008)).
Given the shape of the first stage, fuzzy regression discontinuity
methods (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Hahn et al., 2001) are used. A
dummy indicating whether the student originally obtained a C
grade (i.e. pre-review) is used to instrument for whether or not an
individual receives a final C grade, in parametric models that control
for the original distribution of marks (centred at 180 marks) as the
forcing variable. Changes in slope on either side of the cut-off are
modelled through an interaction between the forcing variable and
the instrument, as suggested by Imbens and Lemieux (2008). We
also estimate parametric regressions where we limit the sample to
individuals that are very close to the grade C threshold in the original
(pre-review) distribution of marks, and non-parametric regressions.
We test whether any other observable characteristic of students
(such as prior attainment) varies discontinuously at this threshold
and show that this can be ruled out.
As Battistin and Rettore (2008) show, the impact of treatment in this
partially fuzzy regression discontinuity design can be estimated in a
Fig. 2. Final (post-review) and original (pre-review) distribution ofmarks. Note. (a) Histogram showing the final (post-review) distribution ofmarks from grade E onwards; (b) Zooms in
on theD&C area of the histogram depicted in (a). In both graphs, the dotted line shows the original (pre-review) distribution ofmarks. Both distributions use data for Higher Tier students
(i.e. those sitting the Higher Tier paper in Unit 1). See Appendix A for further details on the data sample construction.
Table 2
Determinants of asking for a review and getting an upgrade.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Any review Any review Grade up after reviews
White −0.001 −0.003 −0.002
(0.007) (0.004) (0.016)
Free School Meals −0.006 −0.006 −0.010
(0.007) (0.004) (0.017)
English Language −0.002 −0.003 0.007
(0.007) (0.005) (0.020)
Female −0.007* −0.004 0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.010)
KS2 total points (std) 0.036*** 0.013*** 0.028*
(0.006) (0.003) (0.014)
Original marks −0.004*** −0.003*** −0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean dependent variable 0.101 0.101 0.122





Students involved in any
kind of review (C&D)
School fixed effects No Yes Yes
6 S. Machin et al. / Journal of Public Economics 190 (2020) 104224fully parametric set-up (under assumptions of linearity). More formally,
the following equations can be estimated in a two stage least squares
setting:
Second stage : Yis ¼ β0 þ β1CFis þ β2Mis þ β3COis Mis þ β4Xis þ μs
þ ϵis ð1Þ
First stage : CFis ¼ α0 þ α1COis þ α2Mis þ α3COis Mis þ α4Xis þ μs
þωis ð2Þ
where outcome Y of individual i in school s (the school where the indi-
vidual completed Key Stage 4) is related to a dummy variable indicating
whether he/she achieves a C grade in the English language GSCE exam
(after the review process, denoted CF). Marks of the student are de-
noted by M (these are the original distribution of marks, i.e. pre-
review) and CO is a dummy variable indicating if the student originally
was awarded a C grade (before any remarking). X is a set of pre-
determined characteristics that we are using throughout the analysis,
although their inclusion or exclusion makes no difference to estimatedFig. 3. Proportion of students being reviewed and being upgraded, by original mark. Note.
Graph showing the fraction of students (within each original mark), being subject to any
kind of review and being upgraded; for Higher Tier students. See Appendix A for further
details on review data.
Notes: The dependent variables in all regressions are dummy variables. In the first 2 col-
umns, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if any of the units contributing to the final
markwas subject to any kind of review (units subject to review are units 1 and 3). The de-
pendent variable in Column 3 is equal to 1 if the grade goes from D to C after the review
process. Standard errors are clustered at the KS4 school level (i.e., school the student
was attending in Year 11), with *p b 0.10; **p b 0.05; ***p b 0.01. Columns 2 and 3 include
KS4 school fixed effects. Marginal effects coming from probit estimates are almost identi-
cal to the coefficients shown in Column 1 in this table.effects. Specifically, we include the student's ethnicity, gender, whether
he/she is eligible to receive free school meals, whether he/she speaks
English as a first language and the test score obtained in the examina-
tions at the end of primary school. μ denotes a school fixed effect. Our
main results introduce the forcing variable in a linear way, but we show
that results barely change when using a quadratic functional form. ϵis
and ωis are error terms and we use robust standard errors, following
Kolesár and Rothe (2018).99 When we use the whole C-D range for estimations (where we have a reasonably big
number of clusters as given by the forcing variable – i.e. marks are grouped into 60 clus-
ters), clustering standard errors at the level of the forcing variable does not make much
difference to the standard errors. Also, the results do not change in any substantive way
when we cluster standard errors at the school level.
Fig. 4. First stage: proportion final C grade by originalmarks. Note. Graph showing thefirst
stage. Each dot represents the fraction of students obtaining a grade C (post-review)
within each potential original mark (pre-review); for Higher Tier students (i.e. those
sitting the Higher Tier paper in Unit 1). See Appendix A for further details on the data
sample construction.
7S. Machin et al. / Journal of Public Economics 190 (2020) 104224Weestimate parametric regressions using the full range of scores be-
tween grades C and D, and zooming in to±10 points from the original C
threshold (since it is from−10 points away from the left of the original
C thresholdwhen the probability of getting a final C grade starts becom-
ing strictly positive – see Fig. 4). We then estimate linear parametric re-
gressions over a small range of the data close to the C threshold (original
marks ranging from ±5 to ±1 points away from the original C thresh-
old), as well as local polynomial (fuzzy) regression-discontinuity point
estimators with robust-bias corrected confidence intervals (Calonico
et al., 2014).
For this approach to estimate the true causal relationship between
obtaining a grade C and individual outcomes, passing the threshold
must be quasi-randomly assigned. The validity of this assumption is ex-
amined in detail below.10 Dispersion below the C threshold (i.e. among D students) is always larger than above
the threshold (i.e. for C students), because there are more observations above the thresh-
old (84% of the observations are above the original, pre-remark C threshold).3.2. Validity
As discussed previously, the examination process is sufficiently
rigorous to ensure that teachers and examiners are not able to ma-
nipulate students close to the C threshold in the original mark distri-
bution. If this is the case, then we should observe that predetermined
variables vary smoothly across the threshold corresponding to a C
grade in the original distribution (i.e. CO in the notation of Eq. (2)
above). Prior performance at Key Stage 2 is measured using results
from a national test that takes place at the end of primary school
(at age 11).
Fig. 5 plots the relationship between prior student performance
at age 11 (Key Stage 2) and the original (pre-appeal) distribution
of marks. The graph on the left covers the entire C and D range,
whereas the graph on the right zooms in at ±10 points away from
the C cut-off. Linear regression lines are fitted separately on each
side of the C threshold. The discontinuity and standard error shown
correspond to Intention-to-Treat estimates coming from a sharp re-
gression discontinuity design with the original marks as the forcing
variable, letting the slope change on each side of the original C
threshold and without any controls. There is no visual discontinuity
around the Grade C threshold in GCSE English. The same is true for
the other baseline characteristics considered here: the student's eth-
nicity, gender, whether he/she is eligible to receive free school meals
and whether he/she speaks English as a first language (see Fig. B1 in
the online Appendix).In Table B2 of the Online Appendix, we report regression estimates
where each baseline characteristic is regressed against a dummy vari-
able measuring whether the student obtains a C grade (pre-review),
controlling for the original (pre-review) mark, letting the slope change
on each side of the original C threshold, andwith andwithout including
school fixed effects. In almost all cases, the relationship between the
baseline characteristic and whether or not the student obtains a C
grade is small in magnitude and does not reach statistical significance
(this is evenmore so close to the C threshold, see Table B3 in the Online
Appendix for checks done using the±5 and±1 bandwidth). Hence, it is
plausible to conclude that themarginal studentwho passes the (pre-re-
view) threshold appears to be quasi-randomly assigned.
4. Results
4.1. Outcomes
Weconsider the followingoutcomes: (1) the probability of dropping
out of education at the age of 18; (2) the probability of not being ob-
served in education, employment or training (NEET) at the age of 18;
(3) entering an upper secondary academic or vocational qualification
by the age of 19, which is the age by which most English students will
have entered upper secondary education if they are going to start at
all (i.e. a ‘level 3’ qualificationwhich is A-levels or other vocational qual-
ifications); (4) the probability of achieving a full level 3 qualification by
the age of 19 (i.e. the typical requirement for a university entrant);
(5) the probability of enrolling in tertiary education by age 19 (i.e. un-
dergraduate or foundation university degree or high-level vocational
education). Although this cohort is too young to observe labour market
earnings, having a level 3 qualification is associated with a high wage
premium, even if young people do not subsequently go on to tertiary
education (e.g. McIntosh, 2006; Patrignani et al., 2017).
Appendix A explains how we have constructed these outcome vari-
ables. Table 3 shows summary statistics of outcome variables for the
whole cohort sitting GCSE English Language (column 1), the AQA En-
glish language sample (column2), the subsample of higher tier students
in the English Language sample with marks in the C-D range that are
main interest here (column 3) and the subsample of foundation stu-
dents in the English Language sample withmarks in the C-D range (col-
umn 4). The patterns described when discussing predetermined
characteristics for the same groups in Table 1 also emerge here: AQA En-
glish Language students (column 2) have slightly better outcomes than
the average student in the cohort (column 1), and higher tier students
perform much better than foundation students on any of the five di-
mensions analysed here.
Before showing the regression results, the outcome variables are
plotted in Figs. 6 and 7 according to whether or not students obtain a
C grade in the original distribution of marks (i.e. CO in the notation of
Eq. (2) above). These plots are therefore a depiction of an ‘intention to
treat’ type of analysis with graphical evidence of the reduced form im-
pact. The graphs are for all students who obtained marks (pre-review)
within the range of a D and a C grade (i.e. marks between 150 and
209), where the threshold is at 180marks (see Appendix A formore de-
tails on the sample construction). These show that the discontinuity
around the C grade corresponds to a decrease in the probability of not
dropping out of education at age 18 (Fig. 6a and b) as well as a lower
probability of being observed as ‘not in education, employment or train-
ing’ (NEET) at age 18 (Fig. 6c and d). Fig. 7 shows that students who just
pass the original C cut-off have a higher probability of accessing (Fig. 7a
and b) or achieving (Fig. 7c and d) upper secondary education by age 19,
and starting tertiary education by age 19 (Fig. 7e and f).10 This gives
Fig. 5. Key Stage 2 points by forcing variable. Note. Graph showing the relationship between prior student performance at Key Stage 2 National exams (age 11) and the original (pre-
review) marks. Each dot represents the average score obtained in the Key Stage 2 examinations within each potential original mark (pre-review). Higher Tier students (i.e. those
sitting the Higher Tier paper in Unit 1). See Appendix A for further details on the sample construction. Linear regression lines are fitted separately on each side of the C threshold. The
discontinuity and standard error shown correspond to Intention-to-Treat estimates coming from a sharp regression discontinuity design with the original marks as the forcing
variable, letting the slope change on each side of the original C threshold and without any controls.
8 S. Machin et al. / Journal of Public Economics 190 (2020) 104224prima facie evidence of the effects of narrowly passing the threshold.
This is not evident across other grade thresholds (i.e. C/B, B/A, A/A*)
for any of these outcomes or indeed at other points of the distribution.
Fig. 8a, b, and c show this for the outcome measuring achievement of
upper secondary education. Graphs for the remaining outcomes do
not show any discontinuities either.4.2. Baseline results
In Table 4 we show regressions estimated for two different spec-
ifications for the full sample of interest (columns 1–2, without and
including KS4 school fixed effects, respectively) and for the subsam-
ple within ±10 points of the grade C threshold (columns 3–4). There
are five panels for the different outcome variables (panels A to E).
Each coefficient shows the estimated effect of achieving a grade C
(after any review) on the outcome of interest. In the notation of Eq.
(1), these correspond to the coefficient β1, the (second stage) instru-
mental variable estimate. The sixth panel (panel F) shows estimated
coefficients for the first stage (i.e. α1 in Eq. (2)), which is always very
large and statistically significant.Table 3
Descriptive statistics: outcomes.
(1) (2)




Not observed in education at age 18 8.3 7.9
Not observed in education, employment or
training (NEET) at age 18
3.3 3.0
Enrolled in a level 3 qualification by age 19 87.7 89.0
Achieved a full level 3 qualification by age 19 75.3 77.4
Enrolled in any level 4+ qualification by age 19 36.2 38.6
Number of pupils 383,730 189,4
Note. Figures are in %. 2013 cohort: those in the KS4 Candidate/Indicator tables that belong to y
pre-determined characteristics). Students sitting English Language GCSE in the 2013 cohort are
qualification in English Language with any of the awarding bodies. More details about the samResults are very similar across the different specifications (whether
they include school fixed effects or not, and whether they consider the
whole C-D range or the sample within ±10 points from the original C
threshold) and are statistically significant (apart fromone of the specifica-
tions where commencing tertiary education is the dependent variable).
Overall, the magnitude of the results is slightly bigger in the ±10
sample, but with all the regressions suggesting a sizeable effect of mar-
ginally achieving (or failing to achieve) a C grade. In the sample of stu-
dents originally obtaining a grade D, about 16% of students have
dropped out of any form of education by the age of 18 (14% of students
within−10marks of theGrade C threshold). The effect of just achieving
a C grade in GCSE English is to reduce the probability by almost 4 per-
centage points, with a slightly higher point estimate for the smaller sub-
sample of students.
A smaller number of students in this subsample are classified as ‘not
in education, employment or training’ (NEET) at age 18. This is 6% of the
sample of students with grade D, and about 5% of students within−10
marks of the original C threshold. The regression estimates suggest that
just achieving a C grade can have a big effect relative to this sample av-
erage. It reduces the probability by about 2 percentage points, rising to
almost 3 percentage points in the smaller sub-sample.(3) (4)
English
uage sample
AQA English Language C&D
sample - Higher Tier








ear group 11 (derived from birth date) and appear in the Census data (i.e. we have data on
those students that are observed in the 2013 KS4 Results tables as having sat a full GCSE
ple and data construction are given in Appendix A.
Fig. 6.Outcomes at age 18 by forcing variable. Note. Graph showing the relationship between outcomes at age 18 and the original (pre-review)marks. Each dot represents the proportion
of students classified as Not Observed in Education (figures (a) and (b)) and NEET (figures (c) and (d)) at age 18, within each original mark (pre-review). Higher Tier students (i.e. those
sitting the Higher Tier paper in Unit 1). See Appendix A for further details on the sample construction. Linear regression lines are fitted separately on each side of the C threshold. The
discontinuity and standard error shown correspond to Intention-to-Treat estimates coming from a sharp regression discontinuity design with the original marks as the forcing
variable, letting the slope change on each side of the original C threshold and without any controls.
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level qualification within 3 years of taking the GCSE examinations, the
effect of marginally achieving a grade C is to increase this probability
by between 6.4 and almost 9 percentage points. This is a big effect.
About 75% of people originally scoring a D grade manage to start a
high-level qualification within this time and thus it is not a very high
yard-stick of achievement. Yet, just failing to get a C grade manifestly
has a huge effect on the probability of getting back on track within 3
years. The next panel shows very similar effects on whether a student
is able to achieve a ‘full-level’ 3 qualification within 3 years (whereas
the expectation would be that most people would achieve this within
2 years of the end of compulsory education). As a robustness check,
we obtain very similar results if we exclude observations that are very
close to the C threshold (following Barreca et al., 2011; see results in
Table B4 in the online Appendix).Panel E shows that just managing to obtain a grade C affects the
probability of enrolling in tertiary education. Marginally achieving a C
grade increases the probability of commencing tertiary education by
2.5 to 4 percentage points in a context where about 13% of students
originally scoring a D grade have started tertiary education by this age
(16% percent for those below 10 marks of the C threshold).
The effects discussed so far rely on a partially fuzzy RD design,
equivalent to following an instrumental variable strategy. As such,
they capture the effects of marginally achieving a C grade on com-
pliers. One might wonder whether the effects for this subpopulation
are of interest. It turns out that these local average treatment effects
are very similar to the average treatment effects that would be ob-
tained from implementing a sharp RD design using the post-review
marks as the forcing variable and controlling for school fixed effects.
This is not surprising becausemost of the variation in who applies for
10 S. Machin et al. / Journal of Public Economics 190 (2020) 104224an upgrade is driven by the school attended. That these results turn
out to be very similar can already be gleaned from observing two
sets of results shown here: (1) the strong magnitude of the firstFig. 7.Outcomes by age 19 by forcing variable. Note. Graph showing the relationship between ou
of students classified as achieving each outcomewithin each originalmark (pre-review). See Ap
are fitted separately on each side of the C threshold. The discontinuity and standard error show
design with the original marks as the forcing variable, letting the slope change on each side ofstage; and (2) the fact that who applies for a review and gets
upgraded depends very little on observable characteristics once
school fixed effects have been taken into account in the regressiontcomes by age 19 and the original (pre-review)marks. Each dot represents the proportion
pendixA for further details on the sample and variable construction. Linear regression lines
n correspond to Intention-to-Treat estimates coming from a sharp regression discontinuity
the original C threshold and without any controls.
Fig. 8.Achieving a full level 3 qualification by age 19 at other grade thresholds.Note.Graph showing the relationship between achieving a full level 3 qualification (i.e., upper-secondary) by
age 19 and the original (pre-review) marks. Each dot represents the proportion of students classified as achieving the outcome within each original mark (pre-review). Higher Tier stu-
dents (i.e., those sitting theHigher Tier paper inUnit 1). See theData appendix for further details on the sample construction. Linear regression lines arefitted separately on each side of the
relevant threshold. The discontinuity and standard error shown correspond to Intention-to-Treat estimates coming from a sharp regression discontinuity designwith the originalmarks as
the forcing variable, letting the slope change on each side of the original relevant threshold and without any controls.
11S. Machin et al. / Journal of Public Economics 190 (2020) 104224analysis. The reduced form effects are also very similar, as will be
shown in Section 4.4.
4.3. Local regressions with varying windows
In Table 5, we show results for subsamples of students who obtain a
very narrow range of marks in the original (pre-review) distribution.
We use the same linear model described in Section 3.1, with the only
difference that we are not including exogenous interactions between
the forcing variable and the instrument in any of the equations. How-
ever, we show that results are robust to its inclusion. Again, there are
five panels for the different outcome variables (the sixth showing re-
sults from first stage regressions) and five columns, each of which
shows the estimated effect of achieving grade C on the outcomeof inter-
est. We saw in the previous section that results are barely affected by
the inclusion of school fixed effects. In these set of regressions we do
not include school fixed effects. The reason we estimate the regressions
without school fixed effects is because as the sample size reduces, there
are more schools with only one student in the specifiedmark range andhence not used for ‘within school’ estimates (i.e. they are dummied out
by the school fixed effect). For instance, in the sample of students
within ±5 marks of the C threshold, about 16% of schools have one
student. This rises to half of all schools in the sample of students
within ±1 mark of the threshold. Results including school fixed ef-
fects are available in Table B5 in the online Appendix.
In Table 5, column (1) shows estimates of regressions for the subsam-
ple of studentswithin±5marks from the original grade C threshold. Col-
umn (2) replicates the regressions for the sample of students within ±4
marks of the threshold. Then the sample is gradually narrowed to ±3
marks (column 3), ±2 marks (column 4) and ±1 marks (column 5).
The results in Table 5 are consistent with those shown for the larger
sample and are qualitatively similar. They are generally statistically sig-
nificant. The variable denoting enrolment in tertiary education is never
statistically significant when school fixed effects are included but point
estimates are always positive and slightly higher than for the global re-
gressions reported in Table 4. The point estimates are usually consistent
across specifications with a different number of students. The outcome
showing whether a student enrols in study for an upper-secondary
Table 4
Fuzzy RD estimates: impact of getting a C grade (post-review) on different outcomes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Window: All C&D Window: ±10 points
A. Outcome variable: not observed in education at age 18
Grade C (final) −0.036*** −0.037*** −0.059*** −0.052***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.017)
Mean dep variable, D group 0.158 0.143
B. Outcome variable: NEET at age 18
Grade C (final) −0.019*** −0.021*** −0.028*** −0.028**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011)
Mean dep variable, D group 0.060 0.053
C. Outcome variable: enrolled in any Level 3 (upper secondary) qualification by
age 19
Grade C (final) 0.064*** 0.068*** 0.088*** 0.087***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018)
Mean dep variable, D group 0.745 0.791
D. Outcome variable: achieved a full level 3 qualification by age 19
Grade C (final) 0.064*** 0.071*** 0.087*** 0.089***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.024)
Mean dep variable, D group 0.538 0.585
E. Outcome variable: enrolled in tertiary education (level 4 or above) by age 19
Grade C (final) 0.025*** 0.025** 0.040** 0.031
(0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019)
Mean dep variable, D group 0.130 0.160
F. Summary first stage: obtaining a C grade after the review process
Grade C (original) 0.827*** 0.828*** 0.723*** 0.726***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013)
Sample size 49,231 49,231 14,597 14,597
School Fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Note. Panels A to E: each cell shows the main coefficient of interest for the C dummy var-
iable (endogenous variable in the second stage, i.e., β1 in Eq. (1)). Panel F: each cell shows
themain coefficient of interest in the first stage. All regressions control for the forcing var-
iable in a linearway. The slope of the forcing variable is allowed to vary on each side of the
C threshold in all cases. All regressions include the set of controls described in Appendix A.
Thewindowrestriction is based on the forcing variable (i.e. excluding 10points away from
the C threshold as given by the pre-review distribution of marks). School fixed effects are
defined at the KS4 level (i.e. the school the studentwas attending in Year 11). Robust stan-
dard errors, with *p b 0.10; **p b 0.05; ***p b 0.01.
Table 5
Fuzzy RD estimates narrowing the window: impact of getting a C grade (post-review) on
different outcomes.











A. Outcome variable: not observed in education at age 18
Grade C (final) −0.071*** −0.077*** −0.063** −0.076* −0.071***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.030) (0.039) (0.025)
Mean dep variable, D
group
0.140 0.140 0.144 0.150 0.164
B. Outcome variable: NEET at age 18
Grade C (final) −0.027** −0.028* −0.015 −0.001 −0.012
(0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.023) (0.015)
Mean dep variable, D
group
0.052 0.052 0.057 0.054 0.048
C. Outcome variable: enrolled in any level 3 (upper secondary) qualification by age 19
Grade C (final) 0.101*** 0.112*** 0.108*** 0.113*** 0.110***
(0.024) (0.027) (0.032) (0.041) (0.026)
Mean dep variable, D
group
0.810 0.810 0.804 0.803 0.802
D. Outcome variable: achieved a full level 3 qualification by age 19
Grade C (final) 0.091*** 0.089** 0.090** 0.076 0.086**
(0.031) (0.035) (0.042) (0.053) (0.034)
Mean dep variable, D
group
0.603 0.610 0.618 0.618 0.641
E. Outcome variable: enrolled in tertiary education (level 4 or above) by age 19
Grade C (final) 0.057** 0.072** 0.081** 0.090** 0.073***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.035) (0.045) (0.028)
Mean dep variable, D
group
0.174 0.177 0.185 0.177 0.177
F. Summary first stage: obtaining a C grade after the review process
Grade C (original) 0.724*** 0.720*** 0.715*** 0.735*** 0.737***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.019) (0.025) (0.017)
Sample size 7082 5671 4212 2817 1409
Number of schools 1258 1201 1110 993 742
Note. Panels A to E: each cell shows themain coefficient of interest for the C dummy variable
(endogenous variable in the second stage, i.e.,β1 in Eq. (1)). Panel F: each cell shows themain
coefficient of interest in the first stage. All regressions control for the forcing variable in a lin-
ear way. All regressions include the set of controls described in Appendix A. The window re-
striction is based on the forcing variable (i.e. excluding±X points away from the C threshold
as given by the pre-review distribution ofmarks). School fixed effects are not included in the
regressions. Robust standard errors, with *p b 0.10; **p b 0.05; ***p b 0.01.
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cant and large in every specification. Thus, these specifications show the
robustness of our findings to using fewer students (who are a priori
more and more similar) to identify the causal effect of obtaining a
grade C in GCSE English language.
4.4. Robustness
The robustness checks are discussed in detail in the online Appen-
dix. In summary, the results presented above are robust to all of the
specification checks. They are as follows: (1) local polynomial (fuzzy)
regression-discontinuity point estimators with conventional and
robust-bias corrected confidence intervals (Calonico et al., 2014);
(2) A placebo test based on the following intuition: in the absence of
manipulation of original marks, marginally obtaining a C grade in En-
glish Language should not have an impact on the likelihood of obtaining
a C grade (or above) in GCSE Mathematics. We find that it does not.
(3) Further checks of the sensitivity of results to changing the specifica-
tion in various ways such as whether baseline characteristics are con-
trolled for; whether we include an exogenous interaction between the
forcing variable and the instrument; whether we introduce the forcing
variable in a quadratic way in both the first and second stage. Although
point estimates change slightly in some of these checks, the interpreta-
tion of results is unchanged. (4) Finally, our partially fuzzy RD frame-
work requires the linearity assumption for estimation purposes (see
Battistin and Rettore, 2008). We can nonetheless estimate the reduced
form equations in a non-linear setting and assess whether results
point towards the same conclusions. As expected, given the size of thefirst stage coefficients, the reduced form estimates are slightly smaller
but in line with the estimates obtained for reduced form estimates in
a linear setting. Overall, the evidence suggests that our results satisfy
the assumptions for partially fuzzy RD estimation and that our results
are not driven by a specific choice of bandwidth, inclusion of controls,
or the functional form of the forcing variable.
5. Mechanisms and implications
It is clear that failing to obtain a grade C in GCSE English can have se-
rious consequences for students. Students' grades in high stakes exams
may affect their incentives to invest further in their education (Hvidman
and Sievertsen, 2019). In this context, one possible reason is that stu-
dents are held back by the psychological effect that perceived failure
can have on self-evaluation of abilities (as discussed by Papay et al.,
2015). However, it is not a universal finding that failing to achieve sig-
nificant thresholds in exams has negative consequences. For example,
in their paper about test-based accountability in Massachusetts, Papay
et al. (2015) only found effects for a specific sub-group with regard to
maths (and nothing for English). Clark and Martorell (2014) found no
wage penalty attributable to barely failing to obtain a high school di-
ploma in the US. Our data do not enable us to directly consider the po-
tential importance of psychological effects as a mechanism – except to
note that to the extent they exist, they are only evident for those stu-
dents who fail to achieve a Grade C and not at other grade thresholds
Table 6
Potential mechanisms.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




A. Outcome variable: getting 5 or more GCSEs (and equivalents) at grades A*-C
Grade C (final) 0.106*** 0.102*** 0.095*** 0.089*** 0.094*** 0.103***




B. Outcome variable: staying in same school at age 17
Grade C (final) 0.042*** 0.049*** 0.030 0.039** 0.045 0.052*




C. Outcome variable: attending an academic institution at age 17
Grade C (final) 0.039*** 0.049*** 0.043* 0.034 0.070** 0.055




D. Outcome variable: enrolled in any A/AS/applied GCE at age 17
Grade C (final) 0.103*** 0.114*** 0.106*** 0.111*** 0.151*** 0.150***




Sample size 49,231 49,231 14,597 14,597 7082 7082
School Fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome variable in Panel A is computed using the variable ks4_level2 from the
KS4 Candidate Indicator dataset. The outcome variable in Panel B is equal to 1 if the insti-
tution attended at age 17 has the same school identifier (Unique ReferenceNumber: URN)
as the institution attended at age 16. The outcome variable in Panel C is equal to 1 if the
student is attending a school or sixth form college and 0 otherwise. The outcome variable
in Panel D is equal to 1 if the student is observed enrolled in anyA/AS/AppliedGeneral Cer-
tificate of Education (GCE) qualification at age 17. For each specification,we show: (1)first
row: themain coefficient of interest for the C dummy variable (endogenous variable in the
second stage, i.e., β1 in Eq. (1)); (2) second row: associated standard error; (3) third row:
mean dependent variable. All regressions control for the forcing variable in a linear way.
The slope of the forcing variable is allowed to vary on each side of the C threshold in all
cases. All regressions include the set of controls described in Appendix A. The window re-
striction is based on the forcing variable (i.e. excluding±X points away from the C thresh-
old as given by the pre-review distribution of marks). Robust standard errors, with *p b
0.10; **p b 0.05; ***p b 0.01. School fixed effects are defined at the KS4 level (i.e. the school
the student was attending in Year 11).
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there is no evidence of a discontinuity for any outcome variable at
other grade thresholds). Yet onemight expect somepsychological effect
here too as it is likely that students who just fail to achieve thresholds
for B or A* are also disappointed and aware that this information will
be on record for applications to universities or to employers in the
future.
A plausible potential explanation for the large consequences of just
failing to obtain a grade C is that the range of post-16 opportunities nar-
rowwithout this educational credential or signal. The grade C in English
is important as a credential in itself (as a core subject) and has implica-
tions for another oft-used signal of educational performance: whether a
student has at least 5 ‘good’ grades in GCSE (i.e. A*-C). Both the number
of ‘good’ GCSEs and the grade in specific GCSEs can affect the post-16
educational institution that the student is able to attend as well as the
course he/she can choose.11
In Table 6, we show regressions with the following outcome vari-
ables: whether the student obtains 5 or more GCSEs at grades A*-C;
whether he/she stays at the same school at age 17; whether he/she at-
tends an academic institution at age 17; and whether he/she enrols in
qualifications that are pre-requisites for university entry at age 17 (i.e.
A-levels; AS-levels; Applied Generals). We show regressions with and
without school fixed effects for three samples: all those obtaining a
grade C or D in English (columns 1 and 2); all those within plus or
minus 10 points of the grade C threshold (columns 3 and 4); and all
those within plus or minus 5 points of the grade C threshold (columns
5 and 6). The approach is analogous to that shown for Table 4. Specifi-
cally, we report estimates from the fuzzy regression discontinuity de-
sign of the effect of getting a grade C on various intermediary outcomes.
For each outcome variable, a consistent story is shown across all six
specifications. Panel A shows that getting a grade C in English makes it
more likely that a student will obtain 5 or more ‘good’ GCSEs by about
10 percentage points (from a baseline of close to 72% for those students
originally scoring a D grade). Thus, it can make the difference between
achieving and failing to achieve another signal of performance at age
16. Amarginal studentmay face the doublewhammyof failing to obtain
a ‘good’ grade in a core subject and failing to achieve a sufficient number
of ‘good’ GCSEs.
One door that might close to students is the possibility of staying on
at the same school they attended up to age 18. If schools cater for 16–18
year olds, this is usually only in academic subjects (such as A-levels) and
are likely to have selection criteria based on performance in GCSEs –
where English is particularly important as a core subject. Panel B of
Table 6 shows that students without a grade C in English are indeed
less likely to stay on at the same school. In the sample of all students
with grade C-D, themagnitude is 4–5 percentage points from a baseline
of 15% for those students originally scoring a D grade. The magnitude is
little changed in the narrower windows (columns 3–6). It might seem
surprising that schools do not systematically make exceptions for
these marginal candidates – and certainly implies some rigidity on
their part. The school might be concerned about their (publically avail-
able) performance table ranking for A-level courses (2 years later) and
worry that marginal candidates at GCSE could underperform in A-
level courses (even though this is just as likely for thosewhomarginally
pass grade C at GCSE).
A bigger door thatmight close is whether students can attend an ac-
ademic institution at all. In the sample of studentswith anoriginal grade
D in English, just under 30% attend a school or a sixth form college at age
17. The latter are small institutions that cater for students of age 16–18
and focus on academic subjects. In panel C,we consider how obtaining a
grade C in English affects the probability of attending an academic insti-
tution (i.e. a school or sixth form college). Obtaining a grade C in English
increases this probability by about 4–5 percentage points in the bigger11 https://university.which.co.uk/advice/gcse-choices-university/how-important-are-
my-gcse-grades.sample of all C-D students. The point estimate is 3–4 percentage points
and 5–7 percentage points in the smaller windows (namely those
within plus orminus 10 points; and thosewithin plus orminus 5 points,
respectively).
Students who fail to get a grade C in English might find it difficult to
enrol for an academic qualification. This is not only because of difficulty
in accessing academic institutions but also because of pre-requisites for
some academic courses. It should be noted that many students move to
another educational institution for their post-secondary education
(such as a Further Education College) and these institutions do not nec-
essarily know whether the student is marginal or not (i.e. they do not
have their exact mark). In panel D, we analyse the effect of obtaining a
grade C in English on the probability of being enrolled in a broadly-
defined academic qualification at age 17 (specifically A-levels, AS-
levels or Applied General qualifications). About 24% of all students
with a D in English are enrolled in such a qualification at age 17.Margin-
ally succeeding to make grade C increases the probability by 10–11 per-
centage points in the sample of C-D students. The point estimate is
either the same or higher in the smaller windows.
From the above analysis, we see that more doors are closed to stu-
dents who do not get a Grade C in English at age 16 (i.e. in the academic
year after failure). Another mechanism leading to poor later outcomes
may be the quality of the environment to which they are exposed in
the receiving institution. We measure this by ‘peer quality’ within the
institution that the student attends at age 17. Of course, we can only
measure peer quality in this way for those students who have not
Table 7
Quality of peers in the receiving institution at age 17.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




Fraction of peers in receiving institution (URN) at age 17 that...
A. Achieved five or more GCSEs at grades A*-C incl. English and maths
Grade C (final) 3.012*** 3.287*** 2.718** 2.425* 3.530* 2.702
(0.721) (0.752) (1.379) (1.396) (2.129) (2.279)
Mean dep variable, D
group
51.922 54.698 56.025
B. Achieved a C grade in GCSE English
Grade C (final) 2.874*** 3.001*** 2.700** 2.470** 3.253* 2.353
(0.640) (0.666) (1.221) (1.241) (1.885) (2.015)
Mean dep variable, D
group
60.603 63.288 64.398
C. Achieved a C grade in GCSE maths
Grade C (final) 2.141*** 2.691*** 2.053* 2.144* 2.864* 2.323
(0.586) (0.606) (1.117) (1.126) (1.721) (1.846)
Mean dep variable, D
group
65.253 67.419 68.454
Sample size 45,526 13,187 6350
School fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome variable is given by the percent of peers (belonging to the same KS4
cohort) in the receiving institution at age 17 that: achieved5 ormoreGCSEs or equivalents
at grades A*-C including English and maths (Panel A); achieved a grade C in GCSE English
(Panel B); achieved a grade C inGCSEMaths. Each cell shows themain coefficient of inter-
est for the C dummy variable (endogenous variable in the second stage, i.e., β1 in Eq. (1)).
All regressions control for the forcing variable in a linearway. The slope of the forcing var-
iable is allowed to vary on each side of the C threshold in all cases. All regressions include
the set of controls described in the Data Appendix. Thewindow restriction is based on the
forcing variable (i.e. excluding 10 (or 5) points away from the C threshold as given by the
pre-reviewdistribution ofmarks). Robust standard errors, with *pb 0.10; **p b 0.05; ***pb
0.01. School fixed effects are defined at the KS4 level (i.e. the school the student attended
in Year 11).
14 S. Machin et al. / Journal of Public Economics 190 (2020) 104224dropped out of education at age 17, so caution needs to be used when
interpreting these results since theremay be some degree of sample se-
lection bias. However, given that we only observe those students that
were not induced to abandon education at age 17 having failed to get
the C grade the first time around, the consequencewould be downward
bias in the estimates. In this case, the effects that we discuss are poten-
tially lower bounds.
We construct the following measures of peer quality, using well
known indicators of performance at age 16: the fraction of peers achiev-
ing 5 or more grades at A*-C including English and maths; the fraction
achieving a C grade or more in English; and the fraction achieving a C
grade or more in maths. We show regressions in panels A-C of Table 7
where each of thesemeasures of peer quality is the dependent variable.
We use the same structure as in Table 6, first presenting fuzzy regres-
sion discontinuity estimates for the full sample of C-D students (col-
umns 1 and 2), before considering those within 10 points either side
of the threshold (columns 3 and 4) and within 5 points (columns 5
and 6). The estimates are qualitatively similar across all the proxies of
peer quality and within the different windows. In summary, those
who get a grade C (and have not dropped out of education by age 17)
are more likely to attend an institution with ‘good peers’ (according to
any of the proxies) by 2–3 percentage points.
From this analysis, we can see that if a studentmarginally fails to ob-
tain a grade C in English at GCSE, various doors are shut to them the fol-
lowing year (and many marginal students do not recover from this).
They may not be able to access particular institutions or courses and
end up in institutions with lower quality peers. The consequence is
that they face a relatively high probability of dropping out of education
at age 18 or even being ‘not in education, employment or training’. They
are less likely to enter an upper secondary (i.e. level 3) qualification up
to three years later and less likely to enrol in tertiary education.
6. Concluding remarks
This study considers an important high-stakes national examination
to identify the effect of narrowly passing (or failing to pass) a critical
grade threshold. In England, achieving a grade C in English (in the
GCSE exam) is widely considered to be important for a variety of rea-
sons including the fact that is often used as a pre-requisite for accessing
upper secondary courses and certain institutions, and is a component of
indicators published in the School Performance Tables (where perfor-
mance in English and maths is specifically highlighted).
Up to now the importance of obtaining a grade C in English has not
been empirically evaluated. The results reported in this paper show
that students of approximately the same ability can have very different
educational trajectories dependingonwhether they just pass the critical
threshold or just fall short of it. An important mechanism for explaining
this is the way that this threshold is used as a signalling device within
the education system. Just failing to obtain a grade C significantly nar-
rows the range of opportunities open to students immediately after-
wards in terms of the courses, institutions and quality of institution
they can attend. We show that many marginal students do not recover
from this, even if students can retake the exams leading to this qualifi-
cation in the following years.
This matters for a number of reasons. Firstly, one might expect
someone who just misses a C grade to get back on track fairly easily
and enter an upper-secondary higher-level course (at most) three
years later. This does not happen for a significant minority of people.
The results show that narrowlymissing the C grade in English language
decreases the probability of enrolling in an upper secondary qualifica-
tion by at least 9 percentage points. There is a similarly large effect on
the probability of achieving a higher (‘full level 3’) academic or voca-
tional qualification by age 19 – which is needed as a pre-requisite for
university or getting a jobwith goodwage prospects. There is also an ef-
fect on the probability of entering tertiary education. Perhaps most sur-
prisingly, narrowly missing a grade C increases the probability ofdropping out of education at age 18 by about 4 percentage points (in a
contextwhere the national average is 12%) and becoming ‘not in educa-
tion, employment or training’ by about 2 percentage points. Those en-
tering employment at this age (and without a grade C in English), are
unlikely to be in jobs with good progression possibilities. If they are
‘not in education, employment or training’, this puts them at a high
risk of wage scarring effects and crime participation resulting from
youth unemployment in the longer term (Gregg and Tominey, 2005;
Bell et al., 2018).
More generally, this analysis does not mean that having pass/fail
thresholds are undesirable. Achievement of a minimum level of literacy
and numeracy in the population is an important social and economic ob-
jective. Moreover, thresholds can incentivise students to work towards
achieving them. Although many countries do have exams at the end of
compulsory education, arguably the GCSE exam has higher stakes both
for students and for schools because of the strong accountability system
of the education system in which it functions. The history is that most
young people used to leave school at 16, and somemeasure of attainment
at that point made sense. Nowadays few leave at 16 and all are supposed
to be in some formof education until they are 18. GCSEs have become just
one more sorting mechanism. We show that there are big consequences
from narrowlymissing out on a C grade in English language for outcomes
that are, at least in principle, achievable for most people.
Is there a trade-off between having a national standard and providing
for the needs of those who fall short of it? One cannot simply abandon
standards because of the need to incentivise student and teacher effort,
though it can be difficult to discern what the optimal standard is for
incentivising effort and performance (as shown by Betts, 1998 and
Costrell, 1994). However, one might argue that a good counterfactual is
needed for those who fail to make the threshold if they are very young
(as in the English case) and still need to pursue upper secondary
15S. Machin et al. / Journal of Public Economics 190 (2020) 104224education (which is expected for everyone in England and funded by the
tax payer). Vocational education in England at lower levels is complex
and has no clear future trajectory (Hupkau et al., 2017). This may explain
why it matters so much in England to have doors shut on account of fail-
ing tomake the threshold. Furthermore, and of particular relevance to the
marginal learner, the institution to which the individual enters for their
upper secondary education does not necessarily know the individual's
exact marks in their GCSE exam. In fact, Higton et al. (2017) survey pro-
viders of upper secondary education about effective practice and they re-
port that detailed information on actual exammarkswould be very useful
but is not readily available from a central source when it is needed earlier
in the year. Thismeans that providers are not able to target students effec-
tively for any special support. This is an example of where perfect infor-
mation supersedes a binary credential (as in Costrell's (1994) model of
educational standards). The finding from this study of more general rele-
vance is that there are risks attached to putting toomuchweight on pass-
ing a threshold. They may be mitigated by offering transparency in
providing full details ofmarks to all relevant stakeholders andby ensuring
that the counterfactual for students who fail to meet the threshold is
structured and resourced adequately.
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Economic Association (Cologne).Appendix A. Data AppendixA.1. Key Stage 4 Results, AQA data and sample constructionWe use the National Pupil Database (NPD) to build our sample. This is a census of all students attending state schools in England. We use infor-
mation for the whole cohort of students that completed compulsory schooling (at age 16) in 2012/13. The English education system is organised
around various ‘Key Stages’. At age 16 students complete Key Stage 4 (KS4) which ends with GCSE exams (General Certificate of Secondary Educa-
tion). The KS4 results files (files with information at the subject level) provide information on the grade obtained by students. Table A1 shows the
number of General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) Full Course entries in English Language and English over the summer season (June
2013), distributed by awarding organisation.12
Both GCSE English and GCSE English Language count towards the school performance indicators for GCSE English that is published in the school per-
formance tables. Students can choose between English andEnglish language (which is normally taken togetherwithGCSE English literature). The former
course is normally taken by those students whowant to explore a range of literature and language topics but do not want to take separate GCSEs in En-
glish Language and English Literature. As explained in the main text, to ensure we are considering only those students taking the same assessment, we
focus on the form of English exam that is undertaken by themajority of students (i.e. English Language GCSE entries account for 72% of all GCSE English
and English Language entries, see Table A1). We obtain very similar results for students who undertake English rather than English language.
The biggest awardingbody for bothGCSE qualifications is TheAssessment andQualificationsAlliance (AQA). Over 60 and 55percent of entries are
taken with this awarding body for GCSE English Language and GCSE English, respectively.Table A1
Number of GCSE Full Course entries by Awarding Body (KS4 Results tables, 2014)(1) (2)liver and award the recognition o
d by employers, learners or stakeh
en by Ofqual (a non-ministerial go(3)f learning outcomes (knowledge, skills and/
olders (Federation of Awarding Bodies: htt
vernment department with jurisdiction in E(4)English Language EnglishFrequency Percent Frequency PercentQA 241539 61.6 84742 55.7
JEC 83219 21.2 39650 26.1
earson 37194 9.5 18815 12.4
CR 30061 7.7 8818 5.8
tal 392015 152025ToNote. Number of GCSE Full Course entries in the summer season of the academic year 2012-2013. AQA (The Assessment and Qualifications Alliance); WJEC (Welsh Joint Education Com-
mittee); OCR (Oxford, Cambridge and RSA Examinations); CCEA (Council for the Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment). We do not show the information of an additional awarding
body that accounts for almost no entries.
These KS4 results files do not include, however, information on the exact marks obtained by students. We are able to merge a novel dataset in-
cluding detailed information on pre-appeal and post-appeal marks from AQA. We also have access to information on who asked for a review on theor compe-
p://www.
ngland).
16 S. Machin et al. / Journal of Public Economics 190 (2020) 104224different units of the GCSE English and GCSE English Language qualifications, and on the tier of the externally assessed unit (i.e. whether Foundation
or Higher Tier). The first row in Table A2 shows that the number of AQA entries that we are able to match to KS4 entries is lower than the recorded
AQA entries in the KS4 results dataset (shown in row 1 of Table A1). This is for four main reasons. First, this is due to technical problems in providing
Unique Candidate Numbers (UPN) for all candidates.Table A2







3 From 2013, teachers did not know how raw grades would translate into UMS marks for the controlled assessments. This was a change from the previous year w
ntroversy about potential teacher bias.
4 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/gcse-and-a-level-exams-how-marking-and-grading-works/marking-and-grading-in-gcse-and-a-level-examsObservations. Matched AQA-NPD entries 208177. Candidates with no discounted entries (and no duplicates) 201073. Candidates with no inconsistency in grades across datasets 200983. Candidates with data for all controls 189485
a. Higher Tier all (of which C&D) 146747 (49231)
b. Foundation Tier all (of which C & D) 42738 (33034)Note. NPD entries refer to the entries for AQA GCSE Full Courses found in the KS4 results dataset for academic year 2012-2013, summer season sittings.
Second, not all entries provided by AQA that had a candidate UPN could bematched to the NPD. Third, there could be mistakes in the UPN or the
date of birth registered by AQA or the NPD that wouldmake amatch impossible in these cases. Finally, candidates taking the examinationswith AQA
overseas (i.e., Isle ofMan, Jersey, Guernsey)would not bematched to the NPD data. All in all, the number of AQA entries that werematched (208177)
to AQA entries in the KS4 results file (241539) account for 86.2% of all the KS4 GCSE English Language qualifications taken with AQA.
Students can attempt GCSE qualifications in the same subject (also called discounting group in the data)more than once. While this was a rather
common practice for other subjects (like mathematics), this did not seem to happen very often for GCSE English Language qualifications. However,
our first sample selection criteria follows the advice given by the Department for Education (DfE) to deal with this issue. This consists of: (1) keeping
those entries that are undiscounted (i.e., this is normally the best entry in terms of achievement in the discounting group for exam year 2013,
ks4_disc3=0); (2) keeping those entries associatedwith students at the end of KS4 (ks4_endks=1); (3) keeping those entries that should be included
in national results calculations (ks4_natres=1); and (4) keeping those entries that are included in school performance calculations (ks4_include=1).
After applying these restrictions, we are left with a sample that accounts for almost 97% of the initial sample (see row 2, Table A2).
We detected inconsistencies between the grades in the different datasets (i.e. AQA supplied data versus KS4 data) in a small number of cases. The
observations available after dropping those entries from the sample barely changes (see row 3, Table A2). The last sample restriction is given by the
availability of data to construct controls from the Student Census dataset, which is also part of the National Pupil Database. This involves a bigger cut
to the initial sample, and is explained by the fact that only students in state schools are included in the student census. The final number of candidates
for which we have data for all controls is about 91% of those initially available (see Table A2, row 4).
A number of assessment units feed into the overall GCSE grade. In 2013, Units 2 (Speaking and Listening (accounting for 20% of the final grade)
andUnit 3 (Extended reading and creativewriting, 40%)were teacher assessed (although gradingwasmoderated by the examboard). Unit 1 (40%) is
based on a standardised exam that is corrected (anonymously) by an external examiner. Exams take place after the coursework assessment (at the
end of the school year). We can divide the sample available into two groups, depending on the type of exam that students sat for Unit 1, since stu-
dents can sit either the Higher Tier or the Foundation Tier exam, and these two exams vary in their content (i.e., both the texts under study and the
questions are different). Students sitting theHigher Tier examcan only score grades fromA* to D for that particular unit; whereas students sitting the
Foundation Exam can achieve a C grade at most for Unit 1. Marks for the three units are added up and make the final GCSE English Language grade,
that can range from A* to G, where fails (below G) are awarded the letter U (for ungraded). Most students sit the Higher Tier exam (about 77% of the
sample). These students are the main group of interest throughout the paper. Finally, given the nature of the identification strategy and the focus on
studentsmarginally failing to achieve a C grade,we restrict our attention to students that obtained either a C or a D grade, before and after the review
process (i.e. we exclude students that suffer big jumps in their marks after the review process, since this might be due tomeasurement error). There
are 49,231 students fulfilling the underlined criteria and that will therefore constitute the main sample in our analysis.A.2. Grade setting in English Language GCSEAs explained in the previous section, three units feed into the overall GCSE English Languagemark. Teachers (for the teacher-assessed units 2 and
3) and external markers (for unit 1) are not given advance information on how raw marks on the different assessment units are translated to the
‘unified marking scheme’ (UMS), which is the format of the final marks (and is on a scale of 0-300; where 180 is the threshold of a C grade).13
Table A3 shows how raw marks for the three different units are translated into UMS marks, in June 2013 (Panel A) and in June 2012 (Panel B).
The rawmark that corresponds to the C grade in each of the three units changes from year to year, making it very difficult for teachers to accurately
guess where the (180 UMS) C threshold would be in terms of rawmarks. Moreover, for teacher-assessed units, the exam board issues strict grading
guidelines, and this marking can also be subject to reviews if inconsistencies are detected. For the externally examined unit, AQA employs online
marking since 2012. With this system, markers are not given whole scripts from specific centres but instead, are allocated ‘clips’ from scripts to
mark (i.e. a specific question from a paper). Thus, for example, an individual candidate will not have her entire English Language script marked by
a single examiner. Instead, the questions on that script will have been marked by different examiners.
Grade boundaries are not decided in advance of the exam.When setting grade boundaries, exam boards consider: (1) student’s work; (2) reports
from senior exam officials about howwell the units worked in practice; (3) examples of typical performance expected of students at certain grades;
(4) statistics; and (5) archived exam papers at the grade boundaries from previous exam series.14 The awarding committee does not look at work at
every grade of each paper, but scrutinises work and explicitly recommends grade boundaries for specific grades only. These are called the
judgemental grades in recognition of the fact that awarders’ judgements are directly involved in the boundary setting. For the GCSE AQA Englishhen there had been
17S. Machin et al. / Journal of Public Economics 190 (2020) 104224Language higher tier qualification, the awarding committee looks at the boundary between grades C andDfirst. Next, the boundary between gradesA
and B is considered. Any remaining grade boundaries are called arithmetic boundaries because they are determined by calculation, without any
judgement involved (AQA, 2017).Table A3









Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3Raw Mark UMS Raw Mark UMS Raw Mark UMS Total Raw marks Total UMSA. June 2013
* 58 108 41 54 72 108 171 27053 96 38 48 65 96 156 240
48 84 34 42 56 84 138 210
43 72 30 36 47 72 120 180
38 60 25 30 37 60 100 150B. June 2012
* 61 108 41 54 72 108 174 27055 96 38 48 64 96 157 240
49 84 33 42 55 84 137 210
44 72 28 36 46 72 118 180
39 60 23 30 36 60 98 150DNote.Marks correspond to GCSE English language, June 2013 and June 2012 sittings; higher tier students. Themaximum rawmark in Unit 1 is 80; themaximum rawmark in Unit 2 is 45;
and the maximum raw mark in Unit 3 is 80. The data is for the AQA awarding body. Unit 1 is externally assessed, whereas Units 2 and 3 are teacher assessed.
After the exam, requests for a review (i.e. re-mark) of scripts can only come through the school (i.e. not from the individual student) and at a price
of roughly £40 per script. At this point, there is a possibility that different schools will vary in their propensity to request re-grading for marginal stu-
dents. In 2013, there were appeals for about 2 per cent of all GCSE exams, with about one in six appeals leading to a grade change (Office of Quali-
fications and Examinations Regulation, 2013). Marks can either increase or decrease through the appealing process.A.3. Other data
A.3.1. Student Census
We use the spring pupil-level census (PLASC) dataset for the academic year 2012-2013 to incorporate predetermined characteristics that we use
throughout the paper. This dataset has information on pupils attending state schools, and is one of the datasets within the National Pupil Database.
The controls that we construct from this dataset are as follows: (1) a dummy variable indicating whether the student is of white ethnicity
(ethnicgroupmajor_spr13=’WHIT’); (2) a dummy variable indicating whether English is the pupil’s major language group (ethnicgroupmajor_spr13=
’1_ENG’); (3) a variable indicating whether the student is eligible to receive Free School Meals (fsmeligible_spr13=1).A.3.2. Key Stage 2 (KS2)
We use Key Stage 2 data corresponding to our cohort to construct prior attainment outcomes. This marks the end of primary school education,
where there is an externally assessed test in English, maths and science. This forms the basis of the performance tables for primary schools. We
use Key Stage 2 raw test scores to build a variable of prior attainment at age 11. The raw test score is graded out of 80 for science and is the sum
of two separate science papers each marked out of 40 (total mark is given in the KS2 datasets as ks2_scitotmrk). The English test score is marked
out of 100 and is composed of the sum of two separate test scores, each marked out of 50, in reading and writing (ks2_engtotmrk). Finally, maths
is composed of two marks out of 50 with one of the tests being in mental arithmetic (ks2_mattotmrk). We construct the measure as follows:
[(ks2_mattotmrk+ks2_engtotmrk+ ks2_scitotmrk*(5/4))/3].A.3.3. Key Stage 4 (KS4) Candidate Indicator dataset
The Key Stage 4 Candidate/Indicator dataset contains information on the assessment of learners at the end of their years of compulsory schooling
(when they are aged 16, in Year 11). Whereas the KS4 Results dataset contains information at the subject level, this data set contains information at
the pupil level. We use this dataset to obtain indicators of performance in GCSE Mathematics. We additionally construct a gender variable with the
information contained in the KS4 Candidate Indicator dataset.A.3.4. Key Stage 5 (KS5)
WeuseKey Stage 5 data to construct outcomes (see section A3). This dataset has information on thepost-16 assessment of learners in school sixth
forms, sixth form colleges andGeneral and Tertiary Further Education Colleges.We use the files that contain information about the 2013/14 to 2015/
16 academic years. SeeHupkau et al (2017) for amore in-depth description of the post-16 education landscape in England.We also use this dataset to
obtain information on the educational institution attended at 17 (together with the below dataset). Specifically, we construct indicators on the type
of institution attended as well as the quality of the institution attended at 17. The latter variable uses information in the Key Stage 4 Candidate Indi-
cator dataset described in (c) above. The quality of the institution attended for each student is measured by the fraction of students (excluding the
student him/herself) attending the same institution at age 17, that achieved five GCSEs (or equivalent) at grades A*-C including English and maths
(using the variable ks4_level2_em).We also constructmeasures of peer quality as the fraction of students attending the same institution at age 17 that
achieved a C grade in GCSE English, and in GCSE Maths.A.3.5. Individual Learner Records (ILR)
The Individualised Learner Record (ILR) dataset consists of two main datasets: the aims and the learner files. Whereas the former collects infor-
mation on each of the aims (or subjects/qualifications) the student is enrolled in, the second file has information at the learner level (i.e., provider/
18 S. Machin et al. / Journal of Public Economics 190 (2020) 104224school attended, gender, and other relevant learner characteristics). These pertain to post-16 education and need to be used in conjunction with the
Key Stage 5 file (described above). We use data from 2013/14 to 2015/16 in order to construct outcomes (see section A3). As in Section A2d, we use
this dataset to obtain information on the educational institution attended at 17.
A.3.6. Higher Education Statistics Agency Dataset (HESA)
HESA records contain information on Higher Education Participation and outcomes. We merge information for the academic year 2015/16 (the
first year that, by age, this cohort can be observed participating in Higher Education). All the datasets described so far can be merged by using the
Pupil Matching Reference (PMR) indicator number that is present across all of them.
A.3.7. Longitudinal Education Outcomes Dataset (LEO: P14 and Self-assessment)
We use information about annual earnings in tax year 2015 (i.e., from 6th April 2014 to 5th April 2015) and income coming from the Self-Assess-
ment files in tax year 2015 from the Longitudinal Education Outcomes (LEO) dataset. This information comes from HMRC tax records. More specif-
ically, the earnings information comes from the annual statement of total earnings subject to taxes and national insurance that is issued at the end of
each financial year (P14 form). These two datasets are used to construct an indicator of whether the student is a NEET at age 18 (i.e., not observed in
education, employment or training at age 18). A detailed explanation of the construction of this variable is given in section A3 below. The files in the
LEO dataset can be merged to the NPD, ILR and HESA datasets by using two look-up tables provided by the Department for Education (previously
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills) that allow recovering the Pupil Matching Reference (PMR) indicator for each of the records.
A.4. Construction of outcomes
A.4.1. Not observed in education at age 18
We create a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the student is not observed in any of the education datasets that the student should be registered
in if he/she was enrolled in any sort of qualification during the academic year 2014/15. This corresponds to the year when the student is 18 years of
age, – that is, two years after the completion of compulsory education (or Key Stage 4). Specifically, we construct the variable as equal to zero if the
student does not appear in the 2014/15 KS5 Candidate indicator dataset; and he/she does not appear as taking any subjects (aims) in the KS5 Results
dataset (ILR Aims dataset) in exam year 2014/15. The dummy variable is equal to one otherwise.
A.4.2. Not observed in education, employment or training (NEET) at age 18
We amend the previous variable to construct a proxy indicator forwhether the individual is classified in theNEET category two years after having
undertakenGCSEs. Specifically, we create a dummyvariable that is equal to 1 if the individual is not observed in education at age 18 (during academic
year 2014-15), and the individual has zero total annual earnings in the P14 files and zero income coming from the Self-Assessment files in the tax
year 2015. The dummy variable is equal to one otherwise (i.e. the individual is observed in any form of education in the academic year 2014/15
or the individual has positive earnings or income in the P14 or Self-Assessment files).
A.4.3. Entry to an upper secondary academic or vocational qualification by age 19 (i.e. Observed in any Level 3 qualification)
We use the information in the KS5 datasets and in the ILR aims dataset to construct an indicator for whether the individual has ever enrolled in
any Level 3 qualification (independently of the size of the qualification). This is a measure of whether the individual enters an upper secondary ac-
ademic or vocational qualification by the age of 19. We classify an individual as having enrolled in any Level 3 qualification by age 19 if in any of the
three academic years after KS4 completion (i.e, 2013/14, 2014/15 or 2015/16), at least one of the following is true: (1) the individual appears in any of
the KS5 datasets for any of the three academic years after KS4 completion and the sum across subjects of ks5_asize is strictly bigger than zero (i.e.,
ks5_asize is a variable indicating whether any of the subjects that the student is enrolled in is equivalent to A-levels); (2) the individual appears
in the ILR AIMS dataset with at least one aim – in any of the three academic years after KS4 completion – at Level 3 or above. The information
about the level of an aim is obtained from merging the files from the Learning Aim Reference Service Datasets that are publicly available online.
This information can be merged based on a variable that contains information on the learning aim reference.
A.4.4. Achieved a Full-Level 3 qualification (i.e. upper-secondary) by age 19
A full level 3 qualification is obtained when the student achieves at least two A-level (or equivalent qualifications) passes. In particular,
we classify an individual as having fulfilled a full-level 3 qualification if at least one of the following is true: (1) the individual is observed as
having a value of 1 in the variable ks5_pass2lv3 in the KS5 Candidate Indicator dataset, in academic years 2013/14 or 2014/15; (2) the in-
dividual is observed as having 2 or more passes in the variable ks5_passes_tot in academic year 2015/1615; (3) the individual is observed in
the ILR Learner files in any of the 3 academic years following KS4 completion with a value of the variable ill_l_fulllevel3ach that is equal to
one.
A.4.5. Enrolled in tertiary education (i.e. a qualification of Level 4 or above) at age 19
This outcome is an indicator of whether the individual has enrolled in any Level 4 or above qualification (i.e. tertiary education) three years after
the completion of KS4 (in academic year 2015/16).We classify an individual as being enrolled in any Level 4+qualification (irrespective of the size of
the qualification) if at least one of the following is true: (1) the student is observed in theHESAdatasetwith values of he_xlev501different thanfive (i.
e. in practice, this implies that the student has started a university degree); (2) the individual appears in the ILR AIMS datasetwith at least one aim in
academic year 2015/16 at Level 4 or above.
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104224.15 The variable ks5_pass2lv3 is not available in academic year 2015/16, so we have to define the variable using an alternative approximation.
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